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Abstract
Prospective memory (ProM) refers to our ability to become aware of a previously formed plan at the right time and place.
After two decades of research on prospective memory and aging, narrative reviews and summaries have arrived at widely
different conclusions. One view is that prospective memory shows large age declines, larger than age declines on
retrospective memory (RetM). Another view is that prospective memory is an exception to age declines and remains
invariant across the adult lifespan. The present meta-analysis of over twenty years of research settles this controversy. It
shows that prospective memory declines with aging and that the magnitude of age decline varies by prospective memory
subdomain (vigilance, prospective memory proper, habitual prospective memory) as well as test setting (laboratory,
natural). Moreover, this meta-analysis demonstrates that previous claims of no age declines in prospective memory are
artifacts of methodological and conceptual issues afflicting prior research including widespread ceiling effects, low
statistical power, age confounds, and failure to distinguish between various subdomains of prospective memory (e.g.,
vigilance and prospective memory proper).
Citation: Uttl B (2008) Transparent Meta-Analysis of Prospective Memory and Aging. PLoS ONE 3(2): e1568. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568
Editor: Ernest Greene, University of Southern California, United States of America
Received November 3, 2007; Accepted January 9, 2008; Published February 20, 2008
Copyright:  2008 Bob Uttl. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The research was supported in part by Center of Excellence, Tamagawa University, Tokyo, Japan, where Bob Uttl was Center of Excellence Professor.
There was no role of any sponsors in the design, data collection, analysis, interpretation, etc. of the study.
Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: uttlbob@gmail.com
Introduction
Prospective memory refers to our ability to become aware of a
previously formed plan at the right time and place, for example,
becoming aware of the plan to buy groceries while passing by a
supermarket [1]. While Craik [2,3] sparked initial interest in age-
related changes in prospective memory by theoretical analysis
suggesting that age declines in prospective memory would be
large, at least as large, or larger than age declines in retrospective
memory, Einstein and McDaniel [4] propelled research forward
by claiming that ProM is an ‘‘exciting exception to typically found
age-related decrements in memory’’ (p. 724).’’
More than two decades of research later, the divide between
Craik’s [2,3] and Einstein and McDaniel’s [4] claims appears to be
as deep as ever; narrative reviews and summaries of the effects of
aging on prospective memory have arrived at widely different
conclusions. While some researchers view the literature as showing
no age-related declines in prospective memory, others see the
literature as showing ‘‘substantial’’ age-related declines. On one
side of this controversy firmly stands Einstein and McDaniel’s [4]
study purportedly showing that prospective memory ability does
not decline with aging. More than a decade later, McDaniel,
Einstein, Stout and Morgan [5] summarized 20 years of research
with the following: ‘‘Although the pattern of age-related effects is
mixed, a significant number of studies show little or no age-related
decrements in prospective memory performance on this [typical]
event-based prospective memory task’’. Most recently, McDaniel
and Einstein presented data purportedly showing age-invariance
with focal prospective cues [6] and argued that this is due to
‘‘automatic’’, ‘‘reflexive’’, or ‘‘obligatory’’ retrieval of the plan in
response to the appearance of the prospective memory cue [6–8].
On the other side of this controversy are authors who conclude
that prospective memory shows substantial age-related declines. To
illustrate, Craik and Bialystok [9] consider age-related decrements in
prospective memory ‘‘established’’(see also [10–12]).
The vastly different interpretations of previous research on
prospective memory and aging suggest that a systematic objective
quantitative review of the last 25 years is needed to determine the
status of the field and provide guidance for the future. Are age
declines in prospective memory as large or larger than in
retrospective memory as suggested by Craik [2,3]or is prospective
memory ‘‘an exciting exception to typically found age-related
decrements in memory’’? Are there a substantial number of studies
showing no decline? And if so, what are their characteristics? What
factors are correlated with the size of age declines observed in
different studies? What are the reasons for this profound
disagreement about the interpretation of two decades of research
on prospective memory and aging?
One of the first meta-analyses of prospective memory research
findings by Birt [13] concluded that prospective memory showed
robust declines on laboratory prospective memory tasks but
improvements on naturalistic prospective memory tasks. A more
recent meta-analysis by Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, and Crawford
[14] confirmed Birt’s [13] findings and made two additional
claims. First, Henry et al. concluded that age declines were smaller
for prospective memory tasks supported by relatively automatic
processes and larger for prospective memory tasks supported by
relatively effortful processes. Second, Henry et al. concluded that
age declines in prospective memory were smaller than age declines
in retrospective memory, contrary to Craik’s [2,3] proposal. Most
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1568recently, Uttl [15,16] reported that many studies of prospective
memory suffer from severe ceiling effects, low statistical power,
poor reliability, and poor validity. Moreover, he found that the
best predictor of the size of age declines in one subdomain of
prospective memory (event-cued) was the researcher’s ability to
avoid ceiling effects–performance on easy prospective memory
tests showed no age declines because both age groups achieved
perfect or nearly perfect scores and performance on more difficult
tests showed larger age declines. In turn, Uttl’s [15,16] findings
suggest that the results of Henry et al.’s meta-analysis may be
misleading as they did not take into account the prevalent ceiling
effects that serve to artificially reduce the effect sizes reported in
their meta-analysis.
As an illustrative example, Figure 1 demonstrates the undesir-
able effects of ceiling-limited data on the magnitude of age declines
on low versus high demand prospective memory tasks included in
Henry et al.’s [14] meta-analysis. Henry et al. [14] reported an
average effect size for low (r=2.14 or d=20.28) versus high
(r=2.40 or d=20.87) demand conditions, together with the
required ks, Qs, and ps, and concluded that age declines are much
smaller in low demand than in high demand prospective memory
tasks. However, an evaluation of the quality of included studies
Figure 1. The impact of abstraction in presenting results of meta-analysis using the Henry et al. [14] meta-analysis of low versus
high demand ProM as an example. Figure 1a shows a box plot of individual study effect sizes obtained by Henry et al. including the effect size d
indices; the figure suggests, consistent with Henry et al.’s conclusion, that the low demand conditions (in blue) are associated with smaller effect sizes
than the high demand conditions (in red). Figures 1b and 1c show forest plots of individual effect sizes for low and high demand conditions,
respectively, with the size of the effect size marker indicating the size of the study and the horizontal line indicating the confidence interval for the
size effect. Figure 1b suggests heterogeneity whereas Figure 1c suggests that the effect sizes reported by Cherry and her colleagues are smaller than
the effect sizes obtained by other investigators. Figure 1d shows a plot of actual primary data with the x-axis showing performance of older adults
(mean success proportion) and the y-axis showing performance of younger adults (mean success proportion) with low versus high demand
conditions indicated by blue circles and red squares, respectively, and the size of the markers indicating the sample size of the study. The dashed
markers identify age contrasts that are limited by severe ceiling effects, that is, where performance of at least one of the groups is over 0.90, and the
size of age declines is severely underestimated. Figure 1d indicates that the summary effect sizes in Figure 1a, as well as individual effect sizes in the
forest plots of Figure 1b and 1c, substantially underestimate the true effect size simply due to an artificial limit on the effect size due to severe ceiling
effects. The dashed markers in Figure 1e identify studies that confounded age with experimental design (i.e., ongoing task was easier for older versus
younger adults), and therefore, artificially reduced the size of observed age declines. Figure 1f shows that when ceiling limited and age-confounded
age contrasts are removed from the Henry et al. [14] meta-analysis, we are left with only two low- and two high-demand age contrasts (see Figure 1f)
arising from two experiments from a single article by Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, and Shaw [20]. Unfortunately, careful reading of the method section
reveals that Einstein et al. [20] did not include any delay between ProM instructions and task performance, and thus, performance reflects vigilance
rather than ProM proper.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g001
Prospective Memory and Aging
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1568and quality of primary data reveals that this conclusion is
unwarranted. Figure 1a shows a box plot of individual study
effect sizes obtained from Henry et al. [14]; the figure reveals,
consistent with Henry et al.’s conclusions, that low demand
conditions are associated with smaller effect sizes than high
demand conditions. It also shows that there appears to be an
outlier in the low demand condition, suggesting possible
heterogeneity. Figure 1b and 1c show forest plots of individual
effect sizes for low versus high demand conditions; they are more
informative and transparent as they reveal individual effect sizes
for each age contrast with the size of the effect size marker related
to the size of the study. Although the number of the studies is
small, the data in Figure 1b suggest heterogeneity, that is widely
varying effect sizes, and the data in Figure 1c suggest that the
magnitude of age declines reported by Cherry and her colleagues
[17] are smaller than those reported by other investigators. A
follow-up examination of the method section reveals that Cherry
and her colleagues confounded age with intelligence by comparing
very intelligent older adults with not so intelligent younger adults,
and thus, the smaller age declines observed in this set of studies
may be attributable to this intelligence confound.
Looking at the same data in another way, Figure 1d shows a
plot of actual primary data with the x-axis showing performance of
older adults (mean success proportion) and the y-axis showing
performance of younger adults (mean success proportion) with low
versus high demand conditions indicated by circles and squares,
respectively, and the size of the markers indicating the sample size
of the study. The dashed markers identify age contrasts that are
limited by severe ceiling effects, that is, where performance of at
least one group is over .90, and the size of age declines is
underestimated [17–19]. To illustrate, Henry et al. [14] reported
an effect size d=0 for the low demand condition of Kidder et al.
[18] but both young and older adults obtained accuracy scores of
0.98 in this condition, suggesting that the test was too easy (see
circles in the top right corner of Figure 1d). The left panel of
Figure 2 shows raw non-standardized performance by younger
and older adults in Kidder et al. study and highlight that severe
ceiling effects in the low demand condition are solely responsible
for d=0. Similarly, the right panel of Figure 2 reveals a similar
ceiling effect problem with another study included in Henry et al.
analysis. Accordingly, the summary effect sizes in Figure 1a, as
well as individual effect sizes in the forest plots of Figure 1b,
substantially underestimate the true effect size due to artificial
limits imposed by ceiling effects. Moreover, these ceiling effect
artifacts cannot be detected by plotting individual effect sizes and
they are undetectable by graphs such as stem-and-leaf, box, or
forest plots.
In Figure 1e, the dashed markers identify studies that
confounded age with experimental design (i.e., ongoing task was
easier for older versus younger adults) [8,17], and therefore,
should not have been included in the meta-analysis of age
differences or should have been analyzed separately. When ceiling
limited and age-confounded age contrasts are removed from this
meta-analysis, we are left with only two low- and two high-demand
age contrasts (see Figure 1f) arising from two experiments from a
single article by Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, and Shaw [20].
Moreover, a close inspection of Einstein et al.’s method section
reveals that these two experiments did not include a delay between
the prospective memory instructions and the start of the ongoing
task, a condition considered necessary for the task to allow
assessment of prospective memory rather than vigilance
[1,7,21,22]. This simple example of a recently published and
often quoted meta-analysis shows that summary effect sizes and
associated confidence intervals may be highly misleading when
primary data suffer from fundamental problems such as restricted
range due to ceiling or floor effects. Thus, a new quantitative
review of prospective memory that takes these issues into account
(e.g., restricted range, low reliability, design confounds, etc.) is
necessary to settle the 20 year old controversy about age declines
in prospective memory.
Accordingly, this article presents a new meta-analysis of the
accumulated research on prospective memory and aging to
determine the extent of age declines in prospective memory, while
taking into account methodological characteristics of the primary
Figure 2. The left panel shows raw non-standardized performance by younger and older adults in low and high demand conditions
in Kidder et al. [18], one of the studies included in Henry et al. [14] meta-analysis. The figure makes it obvious that performance in ‘‘low’’
demand conditions was so high as to be nearly perfect whereas performance in ‘‘high’’ demand conditions was generally lower. Ignoring the obvious
ceiling effects, Henry et al. reported an effect size of r=0 for the low demand condition and an effect size of r=20.47 for the high demand condition
(see Appendix A, Henry et al. [14]). Similarly, the right panel reveals a similar ceiling effect problem with the study by Park et al. [19] included in this
same meta-analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g002
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memory are larger than on free recall (d=1.01, Spencer & Raz
[23], .d=0.97, La Voie & Light [24]). If this view is correct, then
we should observe age declines corresponding to d=1.0 or more.
However, if prospective memory is spared by aging, or spared by
aging under some circumstances as argued by McDaniel, Einstein,
and their colleagues, we should find no age declines in
methodologically sound studies unaffected by ceiling effects and
design confounds. To ensure the transparency, informativeness,
and robustness of the present meta-analysis, the data are analyzed
using robust count methods, graphical methods and modeling of
primary data as well as by more traditional methods.
The present meta-analysis also addresses several important
questions and controversies that have not been addressed or have
been addressed only partially in the previous meta-analyses. First,
if prospective memory declines with aging, what is the pattern of
such declines? Are declines linear across the adult life span or are
they curvilinear with accelerated declines after about 50–60 years
of age? Second, do age declines vary across prospective memory
subdomain (i.e., vigilance, prospective memory proper, habitual
prospective memory), cue type (event, time), and experimental
setting (laboratory versus naturalistic)? To illustrate, although the
previous meta-analyses noted age improvements in naturalistic
settings and age declines or no changes in laboratory settings, if
studies in laboratory versus naturalistic settings examined different
aspects of prospective memory (e.g., event-cued versus time-cued
prospective memory) their conclusions may be unwarranted to the
extent to which age effects vary across prospective memory
subdomain and cue type. Naturally, this possibility leads to the
third question: What aspects of prospective memory have been
investigated to date and what aspects remain uninvestigated? The
next sections present a review of the necessary concepts and long-
standing controversies in the field, beginning with the controversy
of how to define prospective memory.
Prospective memory: What is it?
What is prospective memory? Prospective memory has been
variously defined as ‘‘remembering to do something in the future’’
[25], ‘‘remembering to do something in the future without being
reminded’’ [26], ‘‘timely execution of an intended action at some
point in the future’’ [27], ‘‘realization of delayed intentions’’ [10],
‘‘memory for activities to be performed in the future’’ [4],
‘‘remembering to remember’’ [28], and so on. This sampler of
definitions suggests considerable variation in researchers’ concep-
tion of what prospective memory is; by all of these definitions,
prospective memory is required for such diverse tasks as
monitoring a kettle, remembering to get groceries en route home
from work, returning a library book by the due date, and taking
high blood pressure medication every day. Consistent with these
definitions, researchers have used performance on a wide variety
of tasks as indices of prospective memory. For example, West and
Craik [10] required participants to classify briefly presented words
according to print color or semantic category (ongoing task) and to
press an assigned key whenever the prospective memory cue
occurred; they then used the proportion of detected cue words as
an index of prospective memory. Tombaugh, Grandmaison, and
Schmidt [29] required participants to memorize six different
prospective memory cue-task pairs, to perform the correct action
in response to each prospective memory cue, and used the
proportion of correctly performed tasks as an index of prospective
memory. Moscovitch [30] required participants to call the
experimenter every day for two weeks at the same pre-arranged
time. Perhaps not surprisingly, this wide variation in definitions,
conceptions, and operationalization of prospective memory, as
well as apparent overlap with well-known fields such as studies of
vigilance, mayappearconfusingtoa newcomer andhas led tosevere
criticismsof the field[31,32]and even the suggestion that‘‘the lossof
the term of prospective memory would leave us better off, not
impoverished’’ [31]. What then is ‘‘prospective memory’’? What
makes it unique and why should we not simply discard the term?
We [1] have argued elsewhere that one of the distinguishing
features of prospective memory, as opposed to retrospective
memory, is the recognition of cues as signs of a previously formed
plan when the cues appear as part of ongoing thoughts, actions, or
situations [1] (see also Craik [2,3]). To illustrate, when driving by
the supermarket en route home, no one alerts us to the relevance
of this cue to the previously formed plan (buying groceries) and no
one instructs us that the cue signals that now is the time to become
aware of the plan, recollect it, and execute it. In contrast, for all
retrospective memory tasks, participants are alerted to the
presence of the cues (e.g., word stems) and instructed to work
with them in a task-relevant manner (e.g., recall all previously
studied words that start with the stems [explicit memory] or
complete the stems with the first word that comes to mind [implicit
memory]). Thus, the unique aspect of prospective memory is
bringing a previously formed plan back to consciousness at the
right time and place [1,16,21,33] (see also [7]). However, the
definitions of prospective memory cited above, experimental tasks
purportedly assessing prospective memory, paper abstracts, and
papers themselves frequently make no reference to this unique
function of prospective memory and do not distinguish between
tasks that do versus do not require this unique component of
prospective memory. One prospective memory paper uses a task
that requires this unique function of prospective memory whereas
another prospective memory paper uses a variant of a venerable
vigilance task. This situation is confusing, as confusing as purging
terms like ‘‘short-term/working memory’’, ‘‘long-term (episodic)
memory’’, ‘‘semantic memory’’, and ‘‘implicit memory’’ from our
vocabulary in favor of one single non-specific term ‘‘retrospective
memory’’ and then arguing about whether there are memory age
declines or age improvements in retrospective memory. Indeed,
we [1] view the term ‘‘prospective memory’’ as an umbrella term,
comprised of several subdomains, just as ‘‘retrospective memory’’
is an umbrella term for short-term memory, episodic long-term
memory, semantic memory, etc. (see Table 1).
Subdomains of prospective memory. In response to
Crowder’s [31] and Roediger’s [32] criticism, Graf and Uttl [1]
delineated the unique function of prospective memory, drew a
parallel between subdomains of retrospective memory (short-term,
long-term, and semantic memory), and argued for a distinction
between different subdomains of prospective memory: prospective
Table 1. The subdomains of retrospective and prospective
memory
Retrospective memory Prospective memory
Short-term/Working memory Vigilance/monitoring
Looking up and dialing phone
number
Preventing a kettle from boiling over
Long-term memory ProM proper (ProMP)
Encoding and recollecting past
events
Buying groceries en route home
Semantic memory Habitual ProM (HproM)
Knowing facts, things, & procedures Taking same medication every evening
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.t001
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memory (HProM) (see Table 1). Specifically, they argued that the
unique function of prospective memory proper (cf. episodic
prospective memory [33]) is to bring back to awareness
previously formed plans and intentions at the right place and
time to allow us to act upon those plans and intentions. A typical
situation requiring prospective memory proper is to buy groceries
en route home from work as illustrated in Figure 3. We make a
plan to buy groceries but then we go about our daily activities and
do not maintain the plan in consciousness. The function of
prospective memory proper is to bring the plan back to
consciousness at the right time and place, when we are
approaching the prospective memory cue, a supermarket. To
retrieve the content of the plan, which groceries to buy, is the
function of retrospective memory.
Vigilance differs from prospective memory proper in that the
plan remains in consciousness [1,21,33]. To illustrate, an air-traffic
controller maintains a plan in consciousness–to issue orders to
ensure separation of airplanes–and watches out for occurrences of
cues to issue such orders. Although this key distinction between
prospective memory proper and vigilance–the requirement to
retrieve the plan and bring it back to consciousness–is widely
acknowledged, it is rarely made explicit in the prospective memory
literature (but see [1,21,33]) and more often only briefly
acknowledged, typically within the method section of the
manuscript where it is easily missed. To illustrate, McDaniel et
al.[7] explain ‘‘If a cue produces enough interaction with a
memory trace, then the system delivers to awareness [conscious-
ness] the information associated with the cue [previously formed
plan]’’ (p. 606) and ‘‘the target event simply stimulates (or fails to
stimulate) a reflexive-associative process that brings the intended
action to awareness [consciousness] (p. 606). Marsh, Hicks,
Hancock, and Munsayac [34] explain in the method section that
‘‘this task was merely a distractor task placed between the
prospective instruction and the onset of the rating task so that the
prospective task did not become vigilance task...’’ (p. 304).
Similarly, Shapiro and Krisnan [35] note in the method section
that ‘‘this delay [15 min] has been shown to be sufficient to clear
short-term memory and to ensure that it is not treated as a
vigilance task...’’ (p. 174). Thus, at present, only careful reading of
the method section allows a reader to determine whether the
report is about vigilance or about prospective memory proper.
In habitual prospective memory [1,33,36], as in prospective
memory proper, a plan is made, leaves consciousness, and then
must be brought back into consciousness at the right time and
place, but in contrast to prospective memory proper, such a plan
needs to be brought back to consciousness repeatedly at all times
the prospective memory cue calls for the plan’s performance.
Prospective Memory Ability versus Task Performance
Prospective memory tasks are measurement tools that are used
to make inferences about prospective memory abilities. The extent
to which each individual’s prospective memory task score reflects
that individual’s prospective memory ability, as opposed to
measurement error or some other ability, depends critically on
the reliability and validity of such measurement tools. Unfortu-
nately, reliability and validity of prospective memory tasks as
measures of prospective memory ability is rarely reported,
considered, and discussed (but see [1,12,16,37].
Two issues in the measurement of prospective memory ability
suggest that evaluation of reliability and validity of various
prospective memory measures is especially critical. First, prospec-
tive memory tasks typically utilize binary outcomes; that is, a
participant either responds to a prospective memory cue (success)
or does not (failure). When several minutes, hours, or days
intervene between the prospective memory instructions and
appearance of a prospective memory cue, task performance is
likely to reflect prospective memory proper but this single binary
outcome trial is inefficient and much less reliable than continuous
indices used to measure retrospective memory [1,12,16]. In
contrast, when many prospective memory cues are presented, for
example, one cue every 30s for a total of 30 cues, the proportion of
successes is more reliable than a single or a few cues (e.g.,
reliability improved from 0.12 with 6 cues to 0.62 with 30 cues in
Kelemen et al. [37] using a task modeled after Einstein and
McDaniel [4]) and the proportion can be treated as a continuous
rather than discrete measure. However, the problem with using
such a large number of cues is that the plan tends to remain in
consciousness and the task then measures vigilance rather than
prospective memory proper. Accordingly, the majority of indices
of prospective memory proper used in previous research suffer
from low reliability due to binary outcome measurement (but see
[12,16] for examples of highly reliable continuous indices of
prospective memory proper).
Second, as illustrated by the example of buying groceries en
route home, it is widely recognized that success on prospective
memory tasks depends on two components: a prospective
component (becoming aware of the plan at the right time and
place) and a retrospective component (being able to recollect the
content of the plan, e.g., what groceries to buy) [1,4,16,33,38].
Accordingly, when a prospective memory measure has a heavy
retrospective memory component (e.g., when participants have to
respond to 30 different prospective memory cues, that is,
remember 30 cue-action pairs [39]), successful performance will
depend more upon the retrospective rather than the prospective
component, and the index will have low validity in measuring
prospective memory ability [1,16]. An even more extreme
example is illustrated by Martin, Kliegel, and McDaniel’s [40]
study. According to the method section, when it was time to
initiate the prospective memory plan, Martin et al. told participants
Figure 3. A typical situation requiring ProM proper (prospec-
tive memory proper) is to buy groceries en route home from
work. We make a plan to buy groceries but then we go about our daily
activities and do not maintain the plan in consciousness. The function
of prospective memory proper is to bring the plan back to
consciousness at the right time and place, when we are approaching
the ProM cue, a supermarket.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g003
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‘‘participants not initiating the multitask prospective memory
paradigm by themselves were prompted by the experimenter [emphasis
added]’’, p. 199). The participants’ ability to recollect the previously
formed plan (i.e., the number of prospective memory subtasks
started) was then used as the index of prospective memory, even
though this measure indexes primarily retrospective memory ability.
A number of researchers [1,11,38] have pointed out that the
prospective memory component can be measured more directly by
minimizing the retrospective memory component load and by
requiring participants to respond with a simple action such as
stopping in response to noticing the cue. This action of stopping is
the best index of the prospective memory component and the least
confounded by retrospective memory ability to recollect the
content of the plan.
Event-Cued versus Time-Cued Tasks
Harris [36] and other prospective memory researchers have
made a distinction between event-cued and time-cued prospective
memory tasks. In event-cued prospective memory tasks, a
prospective memory cue is an event, such as passing a
supermarket, whereas in time-cued prospective memory tasks, a
prospective memory cue is time, such as 3 p.m.. However, a time
cue can frequently be seen as an event cue or it can be translated
into an event cue. To illustrate, a time cue is frequently
accompanied by an event cue, for example, 9 p.m. is accompanied
by sunset. In contrast, an event cue is often difficult, if not
impossible, to translate to a time cue. Thus, we [1] have argued
elsewhere that time may simply be a less intrusive cue than many
event cues and the question whether time versus event-cued
prospective memory is fundamentally different is not yet settled.
Laboratory versus Naturalistic Tasks
It has been argued that people’s behavior in laboratory
conditions is not necessarily the same as in natural settings, and
in turn, that research findings obtained with laboratory (artificial)
tasks need not generalize to naturalistic tasks for a number of
reasons, including lack of experimental control over naturalistic
tasks and differential familiarity of participants with laboratory
tasks. Indeed, early studies of prospective memory showed that
older adults outperformed younger adults in natural settings [30]
but that younger adults outperformed older adults in laboratory
settings [38], the findings later supported by Birt’s meta-analysis of
prospective memory research findings [13] and confirmed by
Henry et al. [14]. However, as noted above, this conclusion may
be misleading if studies in laboratory versus naturalistic settings
examined different aspects of prospective memory (e.g., event-
cued versus time-cued prospective memory).
Dichotomous versus Continuous Measurement of
Prospective Memory Ability
In prospective memory and other research fields, continuous
ability measures are very rare [1,12] and dichotomous success/
failure measures are prevalent, even though the underlying ability
is continuous and true scores are most likely normally distributed.
What is the effect of having only dichotomous or dichotomized
measures on estimated standardized effect sizes used in previous
meta-analyses of prospective memory? Dichotomization of
continuous scores (true or observed ones) discards information
about individual differences, measures individual differences with
a greater degree of error, therefore, decreasing the reliability of
measurement and, as discussed above, resulting in artificially lower
effect sizes [41].
An even lesser known fact is that this decrease in reliability
depends on the specific dichotomization point–the cutoff score
where a continuous measure is dichotomized–and test difficulty
when ability is measured using dichotomous success/failure
outcome measures. Specifically, the observed effect size dO=h/
sqrt(p*q), where p is proportion of population above the cutoff
point (proportion of successes), q is proportion of the population
below the cut off point (proportion of failures), and h is ordinate of
the normal curve at the point of dichotomization. Figure 4 and
Table 2 illustrate the influence of dichotomization on effect size;
dichotomization reduces the true effect size by at least 30% when
p=q but by much more as the split becomes more uneven with
reduction of 70% or more when the ratio of success to failures is
10:90 or more extreme.
Clearly, dichotomous measurement substantially underesti-
mates the true population effect size and such underestimation is
much more severe as the proportion of successes to failures is more
extreme [41]. Thus, because effect size estimates underestimate
true effect sizes much more for dichotomous than for continuous
data, the effect of aging on prospective versus retrospective
memory will appear smaller, and seemingly contradict Craik’s
[2,3] theory, solely due to differences in measurement methods (dichoto-
mous indices for prospective memory versus continuous indices for
retrospective memory) rather than true differences in function.
Effect Size Indices for Dichotomous Prospective Memory
Data
Many handbooks on how to do meta-analysis focus on the most
widely used index of effect size–the standardized mean difference d , the
difference between means divided by the standard deviation. They
offer various formulas on how to calculate d from means and SDs
as well as from other statistics (i.e., rs, ts, Fs, chi-squares) when
means and SDs are not available. Similarly, many of these texts
also discuss and provide various computational and translational
formulas for an alternative effect size index r [42]. Moreover, these
texts typically recommend the phi correlation coefficient as an
effect size index that can be calculated over dichotomous outcome
measures and easily translated to d using the same d from r
formulas (e.g., [42]). However, others have pointed out that d and r
are not necessarily the most appropriate indices of effect size, that
selection of an effect size index has to consider limitations and
assumptions of using each specific index, and that mindless use of d
or r may lead to substantial inferential errors [43]. Specifically, the
effect size d–difference between the means divided by the standard
deviation–depends critically on several basic assumptions, most
importantly that the means reflect true abilities and the standard
deviations reflect true variability. To the extent to which these
basic assumptions are violated, for example, because of ceiling and
floor effects, the effect size d will lead to misleading results.
Moreover, while d is an appropriate effect size metric for
continuous measures, it severely underestimates the true effect
size when it is used with dichotomized variables, that is, variables
that are continuous in nature but are measured using dichotomous
indices such as failure/success indices [43,44].
Figure 4 and Table 2 demonstrate the undesirable consequences
of using d or r-to-d translational formulas with dichotomized
performance indices. Figure 4a shows the hypothetical distribution
of true ability scores in two groups–younger and older adults. It
shows that older adults perform 1 SD below younger adults, and
thus, the size of this age decline in terms of d is 1.0. When this
continuously distributed ability is measured using dichotomous
success/failure measures, test difficulty determines the cut-off
point. Sliding the cut-off point to the left makes the test easier
whereas sliding the cut-off point to the right makes it more
Prospective Memory and Aging
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1568Figure 4. Undesirable consequences of using d or r-to-d translational formulas with dichotomized performance indices. Panel A
shows a hypothetical distribution of true ability scores in two groups–younger and older adults–when the true effect size is 1.0. Panel B shows the
proportion of younger persons passing the test as a function of test difficulty–proportion of older persons passing the test–for three true effect sizes:
0.5 (dashed line closest to the diagonal), 1.0 (solid line), 1.5 (dashed line farthest from the diagonal), with diagonal representing the line of no age-
differences in proportion of persons passing the test. Panel C show raw age decline as a function of older adults’ performance; it demonstrates that as
the test becomes easier and easier, the raw differences between proportions of younger and older persons diminish, clearly limited by the ceiling, the
diagonal line indicating maximum possible age decline for a given level of older adults performance. Panel D shows observed d (calculated from phi)
as a function of test difficulty (performance of older adults). Panel E show the underestimate of observed d as a proportion of true effect size d; for
our example true effect size d=1.0. Panel F shows the statistical power to detect true effect size d of 1.0 SD with 10, 30, and 100 participants, when
using dichotomized measures, as a function of test difficulty. See Table 2 for numerical examples and the text for a more detailed explanation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g004
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younger adults’ mean), .69 of younger and .31 of older adults pass
the test; for a cut-off point set at z=2.2, .98 of younger and .84 of
older adults pass the test; and for a cut off point set at z=23, .99
of younger and .98 of older adults pass the test (see Table 2).
Figure 4b shows the proportion of younger persons passing the test
as a function of the proportion of older persons passing the test for
three true effect sizes: 20.5 (dashed line closest to the diagonal),
21.0 (solid line), 21.5 (dashed line farthest from the diagonal),
with the diagonal representing the line of no age differences in
proportion of persons passing the test. As the test becomes easier
(or more difficult) the separation between the lines of different true
effect sizes decreases. Figure 4c shows raw age declines as a
function of older adults’ performance; it demonstrates that as the
test becomes easier, the raw differences between proportions of
younger and older persons diminish, clearly limited by the ceiling,
the diagonal line indicating maximum possible age decline for a
given level of older adults’ (lower scoring group’s) performance.
Using phi and the usual phi-to-d transformation formula
published in meta-analysis recipes [42,45], the observed d based
on the dichotomized data can be calculated as a function of test
difficulty; panel D shows that the observed d severely underesti-
mates the true effect size and that this underestimation is especially
severe when the test is easy or very difficult. Figure 4e shows the
underestimate of observed d as a proportion of true effect size d; for
our example true effect size d=1.0, the panel shows that observed
d is underestimated by as much as 50% by the time performance of
older adults reaches .80 and by as much as 60% by the time it
reaches .90. This shows that researchers need to adjust test
difficulty down to 0.2 to 0.4 (in terms of older adults’ passing rate)
to allow for their dichotomized success/failure indices to capture
the largest portion of true effect size, and even then, the
dichotomous measures will miss about 20% of true effect size,
depending on the true effect size. In turn, Figure 4f shows the
statistical power to detect the true effect size d of 1.0 SD with 10,
30, and 100 participants, when using dichotomized measures, as a
function of test difficulty. A recent review of event-cued
prospective memory demonstrated that many studies employed
as few as 12 participants per age group and few employed more
than 30 participants [16]. Clearly, studies that use only 12
participants per age group are so severely underpowered that,
more often than not, one must find no age differences even though
the true age effect size is large (i.e., 1.0 SD). Moreover, age
differences are next to impossible to detect when the test is easy,
when a substantial portion of lower scoring older adults pass the
test and performance is limited by ceiling effects. Similarly, even
studies with 30 participants remain severely underpowered when a
dichotomous measure is too easy. To illustrate, when older adults
performance is .80 and above, the power of the test is less than
50% to detect true age differences as large as d=1.0. Finally, even
with a massive true age decline of 1.5 SD, power drops well below
the desirable .95 when performance of older adults surpasses 0.80.
What is then the best effect size index for dichotomous data?
Theoretical analysis (see Figure 4) as well as recent Monte Carlo
simulation evidence [43] suggest that d calculated from dichoto-
mous data using observed means and SDs (denoted dp) as well as d
from phi (dphi) are one of the worst effect size indices for
dichotomous data as they underestimate the true effect size so
severely. Several alternative indices are clearly preferable,
including odds ratios (OR) and probit indices. Both of these
indices allow easy translation to the effect size d equivalent (dhh for
OR and dprobit for probit) and underestimate the true effect size
much less and only at much more extreme test difficulties than dp
or dphi [43]. The last four rows of Table 2 illustrate this point for
our hypothetical example of true d=1.0 and dichotomization
points ranging from 22.5 to 2.0 relative to younger adults (with
100 participants in each age group). Whereas dp and dphi range from
a low of 2.31 (for a dichotomization point set at z=22.5) to a
high of 20.82 (for z=20.5) when true d is 1.0, dhh performs much
better (ranging from 20.88 to 21.23) and dprobit estimates the true
effect size the best (ranging from 20.85 to 21.06).
An alternative and preferred solution is to use a model fitting
approach to determine which effect size curve fits the data best.
Specifically, the performance of younger adults can be plotted as a
function of performance of older adults for all previous
investigations (cf., L’Abbe ´ plot [46]) and then find the best fitting
theoretical effect size curve (see Figure 4b for examples) using
double variate error minimization methods, either with or without
weighting each point by its sample size. This modeling procedure
will result in an unbiased estimate of true effect size, unaffected by
ceiling effects, skewed standard deviations, low test reliability, and
other distribution problems. Moreover, bootstrapping techniques
Table 2. Effect of dichotomization on various effect size indices when true effect size d=21.0.
Dichotomization point (zyoung)
2.5 22 21.5 21.5 20.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
pyoung 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.84 0.69 0.50 0.31 0.16 0.07 0.02
pold 0.93 0.84 0.69 0.50 0.31 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00
nyoung passed 99 98 93 84 69 50 31 16 7 2
nold passed 93 84 69 50 31 16 7 2 1 0
nyoung failed 1 2 7 16 31 50 69 84 93 98
nold failed 7 16 31 50 69 84 93 98 99 100
pold-pyoung 20.06 20.14 20.24 20.34 20.38 20.34 20.24 20.14 20.06 20.02
dphi 20.31 20.50 20.64 20.77 20.82 20.77 20.64 20.50 20.31 20.20
dp 20.31 20.50 20.64 20.78 20.82 20.78 20.64 20.50 20.31 20.20
dhh 21.11 21.23 20.98 20.91 20.88 20.91 20.98 21.23 21.11 -.–
dprobit 20.85 21.06 20.98 20.99 20.99 20.99 20.98 21.06 20.85 -.–
Note. This example assumes that n per group is 100.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.t002
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for differences between estimated ds between various subdomains
[47–49].
Shortcomings of Prospective Memory Research
Prospective memory researchers have been criticized for their
failure to define and delineate that which they are studying [31,32]
(see also [1]). This criticism seems to be as true today as it was a
decade ago. As pointed out above, the vast majority of definitions
of prospective memory found in individual reports assume that
widely discrepant tasks, such as monitoring a kettle and
remembering to buy groceries en route home, measure the same
unitary construct–the ability to remember to perform some
planned action at the appropriate time in the future. However,
mounting experimental evidence suggests that this assumption is
unwarranted and that prospective memory, like retrospective
memory, is comprised of several subdomains, and that the
magnitude of age declines varies across the subdomains of
prospective memory. If so, the controversy about the effects of
aging on prospective memory may be entirely artificial, entirely
due to researchers talking about different subdomains of
prospective memory, one that shows small or minimal age
differences and the other that shows large, substantial age declines.
Moreover, averaging across the subdomains as if they did not exist
is tantamount to taking watermelons, oranges, and grapes,
averaging their weight, sizes, and flavors, and hoping that this
will tell us something about fruit in general.
Equally importantly, any informative meta-analysis of prospec-
tive memory must take into account not only methodological
problems afflicting large proportion of research in the area (ceiling
effects, low reliability, age confounds) but also the dichotomous
nature of the vast majority of prospective memory indices that
render dp and dphi based indices inappropriate for the reasons
discussed above.
Transparent, Informative, and Robust Meta-Analysis of
Prospective Memory and Aging
The present meta-analysis of previous prospective memory
research has three aims. The first aim is to map out aspects of
prospective memory that have been investigated versus aspects
that have been largely ignored, by tabulating how many age
contrasts fall in to each of the 12 cells formed by crossing
prospective memory subdomain (prospective memory proper,
vigilance, habitual prospective memory), cue type (event-cued
versus time-cued), and experimental setting (laboratory versus
naturalistic). The second aim is to determine if prospective
memory declines with age, the pattern of any age declines across
the adult lifespan (e.g., linear versus accelerated), and the extent to
which the magnitude of age differences varies with prospective
memory subdomain, cue type, experimental setting, as well as
other design variables. Are some aspects of event-cued prospective
memory spared by aging as claimed by some researchers? Are age
declines in prospective memory proper larger than age declines in
vigilance? Are age declines on laboratory tasks and age
improvements on naturalistic tasks consistent across prospective
memory subdomains (i.e., vigilance, prospective memory proper,
habitual prospective memory)? The third aim is to compare the
size of age declines in prospective memory to age declines in
retrospective memory under controlled laboratory conditions. As
noted above, Craik [2,3] suggested that age declines on
prospective memory are larger than on free recall. Given that
age declines in recall are about 1 SD (d=1.01 [23]; d=0.97 [24]),
if Craik is correct then we should observe age declines
corresponding to d=1.0 or more on prospective memory proper.
Importantly, to avoid biases and artificial reductions in
estimated effect sizes arising from methodological and measure-
ment issues with primary data including prevalent ceiling effects,
low reliability, and dichotomous nature of prospective memory
indices, the present article approaches this problem in three
different ways: robust outcome count meta-analysis, graphical
meta-analysis combined with effect size model fitting, and more
traditional meta-analysis using dprobit rather than the inferior dp and
dphi based methods that derive d from means and SDs, or ts, ps, and
Fs. The robust outcome count methods are simple, transparent,
and persuasive, even if not as powerful as modeling or parametric
approaches to meta-analysis. The graphical model fitting methods
are powerful, transparent, and informative, and make obvious
many fundamental problems with primary data including ceiling
effects. The more traditional dprobit meta-analysis will satisfy
traditionalists even though traditional meta-analyses with ts, ps,
and Qs are non-transparent, and if conducted without prior
primary data checking, may easily lead to misleading conclusions
and claims about prospective memory and aging.
Materials and Methods
Studies Included In Meta-Analysis
The search for relevant studies proceeded in several ways. First,
the PsycLIT database was searched, from the earliest available date
to the end of June 2007, for the following terms: ‘‘prospective
memory’’ and ‘‘memory for intentions’’. Second, the references in
all relevant articles and book chapters, retrieved by any method,
were examined for potentially relevant articles and the identified
articles were examined for relevance. Third, the references in
Henry et al. [14] and Birt [13] were examined for potentially
relevant articles and these were examined for relevance.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. All studies that reported
performance on prospective memory task for at least one group of
younger and one group of older adults; were healthy and without
any diseases known to affect cognition (e.g., dementia); provided at
least mean performance for each age group; and were written in
English were included in the review. For several studies with more
than two age groups spanning adult lifespan (e.g.,[38,50–52]), the
groups younger than 60 years of age were collapsed into younger
group and the groups older 60 years of age were collapsed into
older group.
Tasks were considered to be prospective memory tasks if they
required participants to perform some action in the future without
any prompting from experimenters. This definition excluded the
ostensibly prospective memory studies by Martin et al. [40] and
Kliegel, Martin,and Moor [53] as participants in these studies
were reminded when it was time to start performing the
prospective memory plan, and thus, the ‘‘prospective memory’’
score reflected only retrospective memory–the total number of
actions remembered.
Final Sample of Studies. The final sample included 60
reports consisting of 233 experimental conditions comparing
younger and older adults’ performance.
Recorded Variables
For each age contrast, the recorded variables included authors;
year of publication; prospective memory subdomain (prospective
memory proper, vigilance, habitual prospective memory); pro-
spective memory cue type (event versus time); experimental setting
(lab versus natural); type of ongoing task; experimental condition;
number of participants in each age group; mean performance and
standard deviation for each age group (if available); duration of
prospective memory instructions to prospective memory task
delay; prospective memory performance scoring method (lenient
Prospective Memory and Aging
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associations that participants were required to remember; the
number of different cues presented to each participant; the
number of prospective memory cues (same and different)
presented to each participant; the modality of prospective memory
cue (visual, auditory); and reliability of prospective memory
measures (if reported).
Laboratory versus Naturalistic prospective memory
Tasks. Experimenter designed controlled laboratory tasks
were classified as laboratory tasks whereas tasks performed
during the course of participants’ normal daily activities (e.g.,
sending a postcard, calling back at a pre-arranged time) were
classified as naturalistic tasks.
Event-cued Prospective Memory v. Time-cued Prospec-
tive Memory. Consistent with the definitions outlined above,
each prospective memory task was classified as measuring event-
cued prospective memory (EC ProM) if a task required a response
to an event cue and as measuring time-cued prospective memory
(TC ProM) if the task required a response at a specific time. As
noted above, however, some nominally TC prospective memory
tasks may be converted by participants to EC ProM tasks if task
conditions allow such conversion [1].
Prospective Memory Proper, Vigilance, and Habitual
Prospective Memory. Following the definitions above, each
prospective memory task was classified as measuring prospective
memory proper (ProMP), vigilance, or habitual prospective
memory (HProM). Tasks that included a time delay or
intervening task between prospective memory instructions and
commencement of an ongoing task (I-T delay) were classified as
measuring prospective memory proper whereas tasks that included
no I-T delay were classified as measuring vigilance. If a
prospective memory proper task was to be executed repeatedly
(with the plan likely to leave consciousness between successive
presentations of prospective memory cues), it was classified as a
habitual prospective memory task (HProM). While Einstein,
McDaniel, Smith, and Shaw [54] claimed that they measured
habitual prospective memory, the cue-to-cue delay between
presentations of successive cues in this ‘‘habitual’’ prospective
memory task was only 3–4 minutes, and therefore, the plan likely
remained in consciousness and the task did not index habitual
prospective memory, and moreover, because Einstein et al. did not
include any delay between prospective memory instructions and
the start of the ongoing task, their study most likely measured
vigilance. Consistent with this analysis, Einstein, McDaniel,
Richardson, Guynn, and Cunfer [55] themselves believed that
they measured vigilance or prospective memory proper rather
than habitual prospective memory even though they used multiple
cues and much longer cue-to-cue delays of 7 minutes in one of
their prior studies.
Age-Related Design Confounds. A careful review of
methods as well as published critiques of prospective memory
research reveals that a large number conditions included age-
related design confounds. Accordingly, each condition was
categorized into one of the four age-confound categories: no
age-confound, confound favoring old, confound favoring young,
and confounds with unknown effect. Confounds favoring old are
primarily of the two kinds: ongoing task confounds and participants’
intelligence confounds.
Ongoing task confounds favoring older adults were originally
introduced by Einstein and McDaniel [4] who made the ongoing
task easier for older than for younger adults and these confounded
designs were later adopted by a number of investigators who
followed in their steps. Because a number of studies have shown
that higher ongoing task demands reduce prospective memory
performance, making the ongoing task easier for older adults
artificially reduces the size of age differences in prospective memory
performance and makes it impossible to disentangle effects of aging
from effects of giving older adults easier ongoing task.
Participant intelligence confounds favoring older adults are found in the
studies by Einstein and McDaniel [4], Cherry and LeCompte [56],
Reese and Cherry [57], Cheery and Plauche [58,59] who compared
very intelligent older adults with less intelligent younger adults. Since
intelligence is positively correlated with prospective memory
performance [12,56,60], as well as with many other cognitive tasks,
this confound artificially reduces the size of age differences in
prospective memory performance. To illustrate, Cherry and
LeCompte [56] claimed that age differences were absent when high
ability young and older adults were compared. However, this is not
at all surprising since ‘‘high ability’’ older adults scored almost 2 SD
higher than ‘‘high ability’’ younger adults on a verbal intelligence
test. For purposes of this article, the data are considered confounded
with intelligence if older adults score more than 1 SD above the
ability of younger adults (e.g., [4,56–58]).
Confounds favoring younger adults involve designs that included older
participants who were afflicted by various diseases known to
negatively affect cognition. To illustrate, Mantyla and Nilsson [61]
conducted a population-based study of prospective memory and
inspection of participants characteristics reveals that many
participants scored within the impaired range on the Mini Mental
State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) that
serves as a quick index of possible dementia.
Confounds with unknown effects include conditions where partici-
pants’ prospective memory task was to ask for their belongings at
the end of the experiment and different participants gave
experimenters different items [40,62,63].
Low versus High Retrospective Memory Load. It is
widely acknowledged that performance on prospective memory
tasks is a composite of prospective memory and retrospective
memory abilities [1,38,64]. To illustrate, McDermott & Knight
[39] required participants to remember and to respond to 30
different cues with 30 different actions. However, normal healthy
adults are typically unable to remember 30 cue-action pairs [15].
Thus, when a task depends heavily on retrospective memory
abilities, performance on the task may depend more on well-
documented age declines in retrospective memory than on age
declines in prospective memory. In contrast, when participants are
required to respond to only one cue with one specific action,
performance on the task will depend primarily on prospective
memory ability rather than retrospective memory ability. For this
reason, the coded variables included the number of unique
prospective memory cue-action pairs that were part of the
prospective memory plan.
Lenient versus strict scoring. Dobbs and Rule [38] were the
first to attempt to disentangle the prospective from the retrospective
component and they proposed that participants’ awareness that
somethinghadtobedoneinresponsetotheprospectivememorycue
was a more pure index of prospective memory than participants’
correct performance of the previous plan, as such an index places
minimal requirements on participants’ retrospective memory
abilities. Accordingly, prospective memory scores were classified as
lenient if participants merely needed to remember that something
was to be done and strict if they needed to accurately execute the
plan to be successful on the prospective memory task [1].
Focal versus Non-Focal Cues. Einstein and McDaniel
made a distinction between focal versus non-focal prospective
memory cues and proposed that performance on prospective
memory tasks with focal cues is unaffected by aging because
retrieval of the previous plan is ‘‘reflexive’’ upon appearance of
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participants must work with whereas non-focal cues are cues
that need not be processed by participants during the course of the
ongoing task. By this definition, a questionnaire a participant is
required to fill in is considered a focal cue if prospective memory
instructions require the participant to perform some planned
action when they are presented with the questionnaire and
required to fill it in. Accordingly, we should see no age declines on
this relatively frequently used prospective memory proper task
(e.g., [11,12,38,50,51]). In contrast, the color of a toy is considered
a non-focal cue when the ongoing task requires participants to sort
toys into several semantic categories and does not require them to
attend to each toy’s color. Thus, for each task, prospective
memory cues were classified as focal or non-focal.
Multiple Effect Sizes from Single Studies. Effect sizes
were calculated for each age contrast, that is, for each reported
condition with both young and older adults. However, to satisfy an
independence assumption for application of meta-analysis, each
participant could contribute to only one age contrast for statistical
analysis purposes. Thus, when one group of participants was tested
under 4 different conditions, the following criteria were used to
select the condition used in the statistical analyses: (1) condition
which was administered first was preferred (e.g., name task was
used from Uttl et al. [11]; block 1 was chosen from Maylor [65]);
(2) condition with smaller retrospective memory load was
preferred; (3) condition with lenient scoring was preferred; and
(4) if the preceding criteria were insufficient to unambiguously
chose a condition, the condition was selected randomly.
Data Visualization and Modeling, Robust Techniques,
and Conventional Meta-Analysis. To avoid unwarranted
conclusions and to ensure high confidence in the findings, the
primary data were analyzed in three ways. First, data visualization
and modeling techniques were employed to determine unbiased
effect size estimates unaffected by ceiling effects, skewed standard
deviations, and other distribution problems that are widespread in
prospective memory research [15,16]. To this end, for each
prospective memory subdomain (prospective memory proper,
vigilance, habitual prospective memory), prospective memory cue
type (event-cued versus time-cued), and study setting (lab versus
naturalistic), performance of younger adults was plotted as a
function of performance of older adults and then the best fitting
theoretical effect size curve and associated effect size were
determined using double variate squared error minimization
methods, both with and without weighting each point by its
sample size. An added advantage of this methodology is that it
minimizes the influence of ceiling-limited data as data points close
to either the floor or ceiling have minimal or no effect on the
determination of the best fitting curve. The 95% CI on fitted effect
sizes were derived and the differences between the effect sizes were
tested using bootstrapping methods that are robust, conservative,
and require fewer assumptions than classical methods[47].
Second, for each prospective memory subdomain, prospective
memory cue type, and study setting, robust statistical techniques–
counts and sign tests–were used to determine if the specific
prospective memory subdomain is or is not affected by aging.
Third, for each prospective memory subdomain, prospective
memory cue type, and study setting, conventional meta-analytic
techniques were used to estimate effect sizes. However, given the
dichotomous nature of primary outcome measures in all but a few
studies (e.g., [12]), the probit was chosen as an effect size index and
then transformed to d-equivalent dprobit. Both theoretical and
empirical simulation research as well as the examples in Table 2
show that dprobit underestimates the true effect size much less than
phi to d transformations or dp indices used in previous meta-
analyses of prospective memory when primary performance
indices are dichotomous. Even though these results are not
reported, the data were also analyzed using odds ratios and the
odds ratio analyses yielded nearly identical effect sizes.
To take into account the methodological quality of primary data
and to avoid misleading and biased results, the studies with age-
related confounds were blocked by confound type (intelligence,
ongoing task difficulty) and analyzed separately.
Results
The search identified 60 articles with 233 age contrasts (see
Tables 3–7), representing 10,578 younger (mean age=25.1 years,
SD=11.00) and 6,379 older (mean age=71.3 years, SD=5.07)
individuals*conditions, almost tripling the size of the meta-analysis
reported by Henry et al. (2004). Henry et al. (2004) identified only
26 articles with 83 age contrasts, primarily because they did not
conduct a comprehensive search for all relevant studies (e.g., they
excluded studies published in book chapters, e.g., [11,30]) and
because a number of articles were published after the cut-off date
for their meta-analysis (December 2001). Thus, in term of
accumulated research, the articles reviewed in the present meta-
analysis represent substantial advance over previous meta-analyses
(e.g., Birt [13]; Henry et al. [14]) and represent over 25 years of
research on prospective memory and aging.
Characteristics of Age Contrasts
The search yielded 162 contrasts free of age-related confounds
and 71 contrasts with age confounds. Figure 5 shows the number
of unconfounded (black filled bar sections) and confounded (gray
filled bar sections) age contrasts by prospective memory subdomain,
cue type, and study type (Panels 5a through 5d). This highlights that
there are only a few studies that have investigated prospective
memory proper without confounding age with other variables such
as participants’ intelligence or ease of the ongoing task. Moreover,
almostallofthestudiesinvestigatingevent-cuedprospective memory
proper did so in laboratory settings whereas almost all of the studies
investigating time-cued prospective memory proper did so in
naturalistic settings. Thus, the scarcity of data makes it impossible
to directly compare, for example, age-related declines in event-cued
versus time-cued prospective memory proper under laboratory
versus naturalistic conditions. Similarly, there have been no
laboratory studies of habitual prospective memory and only one
study of event-cued habitual prospective memory in a naturalistic
setting. Finally, Figure 5 underscores that the majority of previous
research conducted under the umbrella of prospective memory has
investigated vigilance rather than prospective memory proper. Most
importantly, Figure 5 highlights that age-related effects in prospec-
tive memory performance for most cells formed by crossing
subdomain, cue type, and study type have yet to be investigated
and cautions against making meta-analytic conclusions about any
contrast that is confounded with some other contrast, for example,
age declines on laboratory versus naturalistic tasks because such
comparisons at this time are confounded with type of prospective
memory cue. Figure 5 also highlights that a substantial number of
age contrasts are confounded by other variables, with the majority of
the confounds likely to minimize age-related differences (i.e.,
intelligence and ongoing task difficulty confounds). In turn, the data
in Figure 5 cast doubt on the conclusions of the Henry et al. meta-
analysis, as they did not take the above considerations into account.
Figures 5e and 5f show the distribution of group sample sizes for
laboratory versus naturalistic studies. This shows that the number
of participants in the vast majority of previous studies was so small
that these studies did not have sufficient statistical power to
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statistical power may alone produce a ‘‘substantial number’’ of
studies showing no age decline in prospective memory even if age
declines in prospective memory are large, even if they are larger
than age declines in retrospective memory as argued by Craik
[2,3]. It is a well known fact that outcomes of underpowered
studies cannot be used to argue for the existence of null findings.
Aging and Prospective Memory
Meta-Analysis via Visualization and Modelling. Figure 6
shows the size of raw age declines as a function of older adults’
performance for event-cued prospective memory proper, event-cued
vigilance and time-cued vigilance tested in the laboratory, and for
time-cued prospective memory proper and time-cued habitual
prospective memory tested in natural settings. It also includes the
best fitting estimated d derived by double variate square error
minimization methods and associated nonparametric 95%
confidence intervals derived by bootstrapping using 10,000
samples [47–49]. The figure highlights that the majority of all
contrasts reveal age-related declines in prospective memory
measured in the laboratory and that such age declines depend on
prospective memory subdomain–they are largest for event-cued
prospective memory proper (the best fitting d=21.13) and smallest
for event-cued vigilance (the best fitting d=2.77). Specifically, the
age declines on event-cued prospective memory proper are larger
than on event-cued vigilance (d difference=20.36 with bootstrap
95% CI=(20.60,20.08)). In contrast, the majority of all age
contrasts showed substantial age improvements in natural settings
(the best fitting d=0.53 for time-cued prospective memory proper
and 0.76 for time-cued habitual prospective memory).
Importantly, this figure highlights that the size of raw age-
related differences in individual studies is determined by the
degree of ceiling effects, that is, the distance of the lower scoring
group from the maximum achievable score. Accordingly, these
ceiling limited scores obscure the magnitude of true age-related
differences in prospective memory performance and underscore
that any meta-analysis that estimates d by using parametric
information (e.g., dp or dphi calculated from means, standard
deviations, rs, ts, Fs, etc. reported in Henry et al. [14]) severely
underestimates the size of true effects [15,16].
The findings are summarized in Figure 6, bottom right panel,
depicting a summary graph of the average effect sizes by
prospective memory subdomain, cue type, and task type. It
highlights that under controlled laboratory conditions all sub-
domains of prospective memory for which sufficient data exist
show substantial age-related declines, and more importantly, that
such age declines are much larger for event-cued prospective
memory proper (d=21.13) than for event-cued vigilance
(d=20.77) (d difference=20.36, bootstrap 95% CI=(20.60,2
0.08)). Moreover, age declines are also larger on time-cued
vigilance (d=20.95) than event-cued vigilance (d=20.77) but this
difference failed to reach statistical significance (d difference=
20.18, bootstrap 95% CI=(20.47,0.03)). Unfortunately, a similar
comparison for the prospective memory proper subdomain is
impossible due to insufficient data. In contrast, under naturalistic
conditions, older adults perform better than younger adults on
prospective memory tasks that have been investigated: time-cued
prospective memory proper (d=0.53) and time-cued habitual
prospective memory (d=0.76) and age improvements appear
larger on time-cued habitual prospective memory versus time-cued
prospective memory proper but this difference failed to reach
significance (d difference=20.23, bootstrap 95% CI=(0.51,0.02)).
Finally, it is impossible to directly compare age declines in
laboratory versus naturalistic settings as the subdomain/cue type
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in the laboratory and vice versa.
Meta-Analysis via Robust Techniques. Table 8 shows a
summary of the meta-analysis for all outcomes (i.e., a participant
may have contributed data to more than one condition/age-
contrast) and for independent outcomes only (i.e., each participant
contributed data to only one condition/age-contrast). For each
task type, subdomain, and cue type, it shows the number of age-
contrasts available (k) and a summary of the outcomes–number of
age contrasts showing age decline, age parity (i.e., no differences),
and age improvement in prospective memory– and dprobit and, for
the independent outcomes only, binomial probability that each
outcome is due to chance alone rather than due to age-related
influences. To illustrate, for event-cued prospective memory
proper, considering all outcomes, the table shows that 18 age
contrasts showed age declines, no age contrast showed parity, and
no age contrast showed age improvement. Considering only the
independent outcomes, the table shows that 13 age contrasts
showed age declines, no age contrast showed parity, and no age
contrast showed age improvement. In turn, this result is associated
with binomial p,0.001. Accordingly, these data suggest that
event-cued prospective memory proper declines with aging. In
summary, the binomial test confirmed what is readily apparent
from the graphical summaries of the data: statistically significant
age-related declines were observed in all laboratory conditions for
which there is enough data available to conduct statistical testing:
event-cued prospective memory proper, event-cued vigilance, and
time-cued vigilance. Similarly, binomial tests confirmed that
statistically significant age-related improvements were found in
all natural setting conditions for which the data are available: time-
cued prospective memory proper and time-cued habitual
prospective memory.
Conventional Meta-Analysis Using dprobit Effect Size
Indices. To analyze these ceiling-limited data, the random
effects model [44,66] with dprobit effect size indices was chosen
rather than frequently used dp and dphi effect size indices because it
is more appropriate for dichotomous data and because it yields less
biased estimates of d across a much wider range of test sensitivities
and is much less influenced by ceiling-limited scores (see above).
Table 8 shows the mean effect size indices and associated 99%
confidence intervals for dprobit. The mean effect sizes are similar to
those derived via graphical and minimization modeling methods,
although as expected due to the ceiling-limited nature of primary
data, they are generally slightly smaller. Critically, age-related
declines are larger on event-cued prospective memory proper than
on event-cued vigilance, p,0.05. Age-related declines appear larger
on time-cued vigilance than on event-cued vigilance in laboratory
settings but the difference fell short of statistical significance.
Similarly, age improvements appear to be larger on time-cued
habitual prospective memory than on time-cued prospective
memory proper in natural settings but this difference also fell short
of statistical significance due to the small number of studies.
Figure 7 highlights deleterious effects of ceiling effects on
commonly used effect size dp using both Henry et al. [14] data set
and much larger data set included in the present study. Panel A
shows dp calculated by Henry et al. as a function of older adults
performance (test difficulty) for laboratory conditions that were
free of age-confounds only (color of the circles indicate prospective
memory subdomain: red=event-cued prospective memory prop-
er, blue=event-cued vigilance, green=time-cued vigilance). As
expected from the modeling work (see Figure 4 and Table 2),
Panel A highlights that the size of age declines measured by effect
size index dp decreases as performance of older adults increases, as
the test becomes easier and data are more afflicted by ceiling
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 21 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1568Figure 5. Panels 1a through 1d show the number of unconfounded (black filled bar sections) and confounded (gray filled bar
sections) age contrasts by ProM subdomain, cue type, and study type. Panels 5e and 5f show the distribution of sample sizes for laboratory
versus naturalistic studies.
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 22 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1568Figure 6. The figure shows younger adults performance as a function of older adults’ performance for event cued (EC) prospective
memory proper, EC vigilance and time cued (TC) vigilance tested in the laboratory, and for TC prospective memory proper and TC
habitual prospective memory tested in natural settings. The figure also includes the best fitting estimated d derived by double variate square
error minimization methods and bootstrap 95% confidence intervals. The figure highlights that the majority of all contrasts reveal age-related declines in
ProM measured in the laboratory and that such age declines depend on ProM subdomain–they are largest for EC prospective memory proper (the best
fitting d=21.13) and smallest for EC vigilance (the best fitting d=2.77). In contrast, the majority of all age contrasts showed substantial age
improvements in natural settings (the best fitting d=0.53 for TC prospective memory proper and 0.76 for TC habitual prospective memory). Importantly,
the figure highlights that the size of raw age-related differences in individual studies is determined by the degree of ceiling effects, that is, the distance of
thelowerscoringgroup fromthemaximumachievablescore.Thebottomrightpanelsummarizesthefindings;it depictsasummary graphoftheaverage
effect sizes by ProM subdomain, cue type, and task type. It highlights that under controlled laboratory conditions all subdomains of ProM for which
sufficient data exist show substantial age-related declines, and more importantly, that such age declines are much larger for EC prospective memory
proper (d=21.13) than for EC vigilance (d=20.77). In contrast, under naturalistic conditions, older adults perform better than younger adults on ProM
tasks that have been investigated: TC prospective memory proper (0.53) and TC habitual prospective memory (0.76).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g006
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on dp using much larger data set identified for the current study.
Panel C highlights that even age declines measured by dprobit are
dependent on the test difficulty but, consistent with previous
simulations [43], less so. Finally, Panel D highlights that dp
underestimates the size of age decline relative to dprobit;a g ed e c l i n e s
measured by dp are smaller then age declines measured by dprobit.
Thus, these graphical presentations may help a traditional meta-
analysist to identify the fundamental problems with the primary data
as well as with the selection of effect size indexes [67] and perhaps
encourage search for alternative approaches to meta-analysis.
Pattern of Age Decline Across the Adult Lifespan. What
is the pattern of age-related declines or increases for various
subdomains of prospective memory? Are such age declines linear
across the adult lifespan? Or are age declines curvilinear showing
no age-related changes until about 60 years of age followed by
age-related declines? Figure 8 shows the results of a few studies
that included more than two age groups, and thus, may allow us to
gain some insight into the pattern of age-related declines for each
prospective memory subdomain for which we have at least some
data. Figure 8a shows performance on event cued prospective
memory proper assessed using dichotomous measures in
laboratory settings for several studies free of age-related
confounds (C’07=Cuttler & Graf [51], Q=questionnaire task,
P=plug in phone task; D’87=Dobbs & Rule [38];
S’04=Salthouse, Berish, & Siedlecki [50]; U’01=Uttl et al.
Table 8. Summary of Meta-Analysis.
All Outcomes Independent Outcomes
K De-Eq-Im dprobit K N De-Eq-Im p dprobit
AGE CONTRASTS WITH NO CONFOUNDS
LABORATORY
Prospective Memory Proper (ProMP)
Event Cued 18 18-0-0 20.99 13 1528 13-0-0 ,.001 20.96 (21.22,20.69)
Time Cued 1 1-0-0 – 1 1-0-0 – Insufficient data
Vigilance
Event Cued 94 88-3-4 20.71 48 2200 44-2-2 ,.001 20.61 (20.73,20.49)
Time Cued 19 15-3-1 20.79 17 738 13-3-1 .002 20.82 (21.08,20.56)
Habitual Prospective Memory (HProM)
Event Cued 0 0-0-0 – 0 No data available
Time Cued 0 0-0-0 – 0 No data available
NATURAL
Prospective Memory Proper (ProMP)
Event Cued 2 1-0-1 – 2 1-0-1 – Insufficient data
Time Cued 12 0-0-12 0.53 10 682 0-0-10 .002 0.54 (0.32,0.76)
Vigilance
Event Cued 0 0-0-0 – 0 No data available
Time Cued 0 0-0-0 – 0 No data available
Habitual Prospective Memory(HProM)
Event Cued 1 0-0-1 – 0-0-1 – Insufficient data
Time Cued 15 0-0-15 0.77 15 574 0-0-15 ,.001 0.78 (0.54,1.04)
AGE CONTRASTS WITH AGE CONFOUNDS (all in laboratory)
Favoring Old
ProMP, Event-cued 48 34-4-10 20.45 30 1039 19-3-8 .052 20.30 (20.50,20.10)
W/o delayed exe 36 22-4-10 20.24 27 879 16-3-8 .015 20.22 (20.42,20.02)
Delayed exe only 12 12-0-0 20.91 3 3-0-0 – Insuficient data)
ProMP, Time-cued 1 1-0-0 – 1 1-0-0 – Insufficent data
Vigilance, Event-c. 12 11-0-1 20.68 5 224 5-0-0 .063 20.63 (21.09,20.17)
W/o delayed exe 6 5-0-1 20.24 3 3-0-0 2 Insuficient. data
Delayed exe only 6 6-0-0 20.85 2 2-0-0 2 Insuficient data
Time-cued vigilance 4 4-0-0 – 2 2-0-0 – Insufficient data
Favoring Young
ProMP, Event-cued 2 2-0-0 – 2 2-0-0 – Insufficient data
Unknown Effect
ProMP, Event-cued 4 2-0-2 – 4 2-0-2 – Insufficient data
Note: De=decline, Eq=equal, Im=improvement. –=insufficient data
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.t008
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Z=Zimmerman & Meier [68]) and two population-based
studies where age was confounded with increased occurrence of
dementia (M’97=Mantyla & Nilsson [61]; H’00=Huppert,
Johnson, & Nickson [52]). The unconfounded data clearly show
that there is linear decline in event-cued prospective memory
proper after about 65–70 years of age. Although the C’07/Q
(Cuttler and Graf [51], questionnaire task), D’87 (Dobbs & Rule
[38]), S’04 (Salthouse et al. [50]) and Z’05 (Zimmerman and
Meier [68]) data show no or only minimal age declines between 25
and 65 years of age, these data are not interpretable because they
are limited by ceiling effects, and thus, younger adults were unable
to demonstrate better prospective memory. Figure 8b shows
performance on event cued prospective memory proper assessed
using two continuous measures (visual and auditory) in laboratory
settings. The data are not limited by ceiling or floor effects and
suggest that there are no or only minimal changes in EC prospective
memory proper from approximately 20 to 60 years of age followed
by age-related declines. Figure 8c shows performance on event-cued
vigilance assessed using dichotomous measures in laboratory settings
from a single study by Salthouse et al. [50]. Similar to the event cued
prospective memory proper dichotomous data, the vigilance data for
younger age groups (i.e., 20 to 70 years of age) are not interpretable
because of ceiling effects, but the data for older adults (over 70 years
of age) show age-related declines. Finally, Figure 8d shows
performance on time cued prospective memory proper and on
Figure 7. Figure highlights deleterious effects of ceiling effects on commonly used effect size dp using both Henry et al. [14] data
set and much larger data set included in the present study. Panel A shows dp calculated by Henry et al. [14] as a function of older adults
performance (test difficulty) for laboratory conditions that were free of age-confounds only (color of the circles indicate prospective memory
subdomain: red=event-cued prospective memory proper, blue=event-cued vigilance, green=time-cued vigilance). Panel A highlights that the size
of age declines measured by effect size index dp decreases as performance of older adults increases, as the test becomes easier and data are more
afflicted by ceiling effects. Panel B demonstrates this deleterious effect of ceiling effects on dp using much larger data set identified for the current
study. Panel C highlights that even age declines measured by dprobit are dependent on the test difficulty but, consistent with previous simulations
[43], less so. Finally, Panel D highlights that dp underestimates the size of age decline relative to dprobit; age declines measured by dp are smaller then
age declines measured by dprobit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g007
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The C’07 (Cuttler & Graf [51], conference call task) and L’90 (time
cued; Levy & Clark [69]) data show performance increases with
aging whereas the D’87 (event cued; Dobbs & Rule [38]) data show
performance decreases with aging.
The data in Figure 8d highlight that the conclusions that older
adults’ prospective memory proper improves with age in natural
settings but declines with age in laboratory settings [14] is
premature. First, this conclusion is based on analyses that
disregarded the distinction between event-cued and time-cued
prospective memory and mixed many time-cued studies with a
single or a few event-cued studies (see Figure 5) as if the type of cue
could not affect performance. Second, the one unconfounded
event-cued prospecive memory proper study in a natural setting
that has been published [38] revealed age declines rather than age
improvements.
In summary, the evidence regarding the pattern of age-related
declines or improvements across the adult life span is very limited.
However, the available evidence suggests that event-cued prospec-
tive memory proper assessed in the laboratory does not change until
about 60 years of age and declines thereafter (see Figure 8b).
Other Moderator Variables
Focal versus Non-Focal Cues. McDaniel and Einstein [6]
argue that there are no age-related declines on prospective
memory task for ‘‘focal’’ ProM cues, that is, ‘‘the features of the
target cue that have been associated with the prospective memory
intention are features that are processed because of the ongoing
Figure 8. The pattern of age declines and improvements across the adult lifespan. Panel A shows performance on event cued prospective
memory proper assessed using dichotomous measures in laboratory settings for three studies free of age-related confounds (in green: D’87=Dobbs
& Rule [38]; in dark green: S’04=Salthouse et al. [50]; in blue: U’01=Uttl et al. [11], N=name task, L=letter task, C=envelope task) and two
population-based studies where age was confounded with increased occurrence of dementia (in orange: M’97=Mantyla & Nilsson [61]; in purple:
H’00=Huppert, Johnson, & Nickson [52]). The D’87 and S’04 data are not interpretable for younger adults due to severe ceiling effects but the data
from all studies show clear age-related declines for adults older than 60–70 years. Panel B shows performance on event-cued prospective memory
proper assessed using two continuous measures (visual in red and auditory in blue) in laboratory settings. The data are not limited by ceiling or floor
effects and suggest that there are no or only minimal changes in EC prospective memory proper from approximately 20 to 60 years of age followed
by age-related declines. Panel C shows performance on event-cued vigilance assessed using dichotomous measures in laboratory settings from a
single study by Salthouse et al. [50]. Similarly to the EC prospective memory proper dichotomous data, the vigilance data for younger age groups (i.e.,
20 to 70 years of age) are not interpretable because of the ceiling effects but the data for older adults (over 70 years of age) show age-related
declines. Panel D shows performance on time cued prospective memory proper (red) and on event cued prospective memory proper assessed in
natural settings (blue). The L’90 (TC; Levy & Clark [69]) data show performance increases with aging whereas the D’87 (EC; Dobbs & Rule [38]) data
show performance decreases with aging.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g008
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were confounded by severe ceiling effects: the younger adults’
mean was 90% whereas the older adults’ mean was 78% in the
focal condition. As demonstrated by Figure 4f it is nearly
impossible to detect even large (i.e., d=1.0 standard deviation)
age effects with this level of performance using dichotomous
performance indices. Moreover, other studies of event-cued
prospective memory proper where ProM cues were ‘‘focal’’ by
McDaniel and Einstein’s definition show robust age declines (e.g.,
[11,38,50]). Accordingly, at present, there is no evidence that
aging does not affect prospective memory proper when prospective
memory proper cues are ‘‘focal’’.
Thisconclusion isfirmlybuttressedbytheanalysis of datarecently
extracted and classified as focal versus non-focal by McDaniel and
Einstein themselves ([6], Table 7.4, p. 143–156). McDaniel and
Einstein tabulated 82 age contrasts from event cued laboratory
experiments irrespective of ceiling effects, age confounds, and ProM
subdomains; classified each contrast as arising from the use of
‘‘focal’’, ‘‘nonfocal’’, or ‘‘indeterminate’’ ProM cues; but, surprising-
ly, did not attempt to statistically determine the strength of evidence
for or against their claim that age declines are absent with focal
ProM cues. Accordingly, Figure 9 shows the graphical analysis of the
data reported in McDaniel and Einstein’s Table 7.4; it shows the
performance of older adults plotted against the performance of
younger adults, for focal and non-focal ProM cues. The figure
includes ds derived by modeling methods described above and 95%
confidence intervals derived by bootstrapping methods. The circles
indicate contrasts free of age confounds (i.e., ongoing task and
intelligence confound) and squares indicate contrasts with ongoing
task, intelligence, or both confounds.
The data in Figure 9 lend no support to the claim that aging
does not affect prospective memory–indeed they are evidence to
the contrary. First, the simple, robust, ceiling effects resistant count
methods show that (a) for focal cues, there are 27 age declines, and
6 age improvements (all except one arising from studies that
confounded age with ease of the ongoing task, intelligence, or
both), revealing significant age decline, p=0.006, and (b) for non-
focal cues, there are 36 age declines, and 3 age improvements, also
indicating an overall age decline, p,0.001. Second, graphical
modeling methods combined with bootstrapping methods show
substantial age declines for both focal and non focal cues,
dfocal=20.50 and dnonfocal=20.72, respectively.
More importantly, the data presented by McDaniel and
Einstein in Table 7.4 and shown in Figure 9 are biased towards
minimizing age differences for a number of reasons. First,
McDaniel and Einstein Table 7.4 omitted over 50% of all
laboratory event-cued age contrasts identified in this review, and,
even more importantly, it failed to include all unconfounded age
contrasts of event-cued prospective memory proper listed in the
first section of Table 3 (e.g., [11,12,38,50,70]) with the exception
of Tombaugh et al. [29]. Thus, the data in McDaniel and
Einstein’s Table 7.4 and Figure 8 paint a very biased picture of age
declines in ProM because, with the exception of Tombaugh et al.
data, the table includes only event-cued prospective memory
proper age contrasts where age confounds minimized age
differences and event-cued vigilance age contrasts where age
differences are much smaller than on event-cued prospective
memory proper (this review’s result). Second, Figure 9 highlights
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the studies lumped
together by Einstein and McDaniel. To illustrate, whereas many of
the studies with focal cues confounded age with intelligence and
ongoing task ease (always favoring older adults), only a few studies
with non-focal cues have done so. Third, Figure 9 also highlights
that a large number of studies were limited by severe ceiling effects
that artificially minimize age differences and render any
calculations of effect sizes based on dp,d phi, or even simple
differences between mean proportions, meaningless (see [6]).
In summary, neither the current comprehensive meta-analysis
nor the analysis of Einstein and McDaniel’s [6] selective review of
previously published data support the notion that age declines are
absent with focal ProM cues. To the contrary, analyses of Einstein
and McDaniel’s data show that there are large robust age declines
Figure 9. The graphical analysis of the data reported in McDaniel and Einstein’s Table 7.4 (p. 143–156) [6]; it shows performance of
older adults plotted against performance of younger adults, for focal and non-focal ProM cues. The figure includes ds derived by
graphical modeling methods including 95% confidence intervals derived by bootstrapping methods. The blue circles indicate contrasts free of age
confounds (i.e., ongoing task and intelligence confound) and red squares indicate contrasts with ongoing task, intelligence, or both confounds
favoring older adults. The figure highlights substantial age-related declines in ProM with both focal and non-focal cues even for this very selective
and biased sample (see text for the explanation) of previously published data reported by McDaniel and Einstein [6], lending no support to their
claims that aging does not affect prospective memory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001568.g009
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included in the analyses made the ongoing task easier for older
adults (e.g., [4,8,17,56]), compared very intelligent older adults
with not so intelligent younger adults (e.g., [4,17,56]), left out more
than 50% of published research, and left out all but one age
contrast of event-cued prospective memory proper.
Delayed Execution or ProM Task Chaining. In several
experiments, Einstein, McDaniel, and their colleagues [5,71]
chained two prospective memory tasks by asking participants to
not respond to a ProM cue until some other cue arrives. Because
only a few experiments used this ProM task chaining, the available
data are insufficient for a meaningful meta-analysis. However,
consistent with theoretical expectation, the existing data suggest
that chaining ProM tasks results in larger prospective memory
declines on chained tasks than on a single ProM tasks.
Effects of Age Confounds
Table 8 also provides information about the age-confounded
studies. For each study type, prospective memory subdomain, and
cue type, the table lists the number of contrasts (k); the number of
studies showing age decline, age parity, and age improvement
(e.g., 15-1-0); and dprobit for all contrasts as well as for a subset of
independent contrasts.
Ease of Ongoing Task. As expected, age differences were
reduced when the ongoing task was made easier for older adults
than for younger adults. This conclusion is supported both by
graphical analysis as well as by probit based effect size indices (see
Table 8). In turn, these results suggest that both prospective
memory proper and vigilance are resource-demanding rather than
automatic and that age declines seen on prospective memory
proper and vigilance are at least in part due to age declines in
available processing resources as argued by Craik [2,3].
One might argue that Einstein and McDaniel [4] and others
who incorporated the ease of ongoing task confound into their
designs aimed to equate functional difficulty of ongoing tasks for
younger and older adults and that age declines under these
‘‘functionally equated’’ conditions reflect true age differences in
prospective memory. However, it is misleading to interpret the
results of these confounded studies as showing no or small age
declines in prospective memory. First, far more sophisticated dual
task designs will be necessary to establish functional equivalence of
the ongoing task for younger and older adults beyond looking at
equivalence of means in ongoing task performance. The lack of
age differences in ongoing task performance may mean many
different things, for example, the easy ongoing task for older adults
required very few resources, and even though older adults
allocated more of their resources to prospective memory task
than younger adults they still managed to match younger adults
performance because the ongoing task was designed to be easier
for them. Second, close examination of the studies that attempted to
functionally equate ongoing task difficulty suggests that equating of
ongoing task demands is difficult, if not impossible even, in
laboratory conditions. To illustrate, Einstein and McDaniel [4],
who pioneered this procedure, aimed to equate ongoing task
(working memory task) demands by presenting older versus younger
adults with shorterwordlists but their ownanalysisofactual ongoing
task performance revealed that older adults significantly outper-
formed younger adults. Thus, the lack of statistically significant age
differences in Einstein and McDaniel’s [4] study can be interpreted
only in light of this ease of ongoing task confound that did not
succeed in equating performance on the ongoing task but made it
easier for older versus younger adults. Third, it is impossible to
equate ongoing task demands for younger and older adults in real-
life, for example, by slowing down traffic for older adults and
speeding it up for younger adults at the same time. Thus, the results
of laboratory studies showing smaller age differences in prospective
memory when younger adults are given a difficult ongoing task and
older adults are given an easy ongoing task have no ecological
validity and are merely an exercise in academic discourse.
The designs with ongoing task confounds can answer only one
question: what are age differences in prospective memory when these
confounds are present, that is, when the ongoing task is made easier for
older versus younger adults? The answer provided by the present
meta-analysis is that age declines remain substantial even after
these attempts to ‘‘functionally equate’’ ongoing task demands.
Moreover, by comparing the size of age declines on confounded
and non-confounded studies, the present meta-analysis suggests
that ongoing task demands influence older adults’ performance on
both vigilance and prospective memory proper, strongly suggest-
ing that neither vigilance nor prospective memory proper retrieval
is automatic contrary to some recent claims by Einstein, McDaniel
and their colleagues [4,7,72].
Participants’ Verbal Intelligence. Previous research has
demonstrated that ProM is positively correlated with intelligence
(e.g., [11,56,60]). In two studies, Cherry and her colleagues
([56,57]) concluded that ProM is related to intelligence and that
ProM does not decline with aging, consistent with McDaniel and
Einstein’s [72] multi-process framework. However, close
inspection of the data and participants’ characteristics reveals
that Cherry and LeCompte [56] and Reese and Cherry [57]
confounded intelligence with age–older adults scored 1.5 to 1.7
SDs higher on verbal intelligence tests than younger adults (this
difference corresponds to a 22.5 to 25.5 IQ point difference).
While older adults are expected to score higher on verbal
intelligence tests than younger adults, the expected difference is
much smaller, between 0.3 to 0.8 SD rather then 1.5 to 1.7 SD
[73–76]. When younger and older groups with more comparable
verbal intelligence scores are compared in these two studies (i.e.,
‘‘high’’ intelligence young group and ‘‘low’’ intelligence older
group), substantial age declines in ProM are apparent in both.
Discussion
Themeta-analysisoflaboratoryfindingsrevealsasubstantialbody
of evidence for the following key conclusions: First, both event-cued
prospective memory proper and vigilance decline with aging.
Second, age declines are much larger on prospective memory
proper than on vigilance. And third, age declines in prospective
memory proper (d=1.13) are as large or even larger than those
found with classical retrospective memory tests such as verbal
learning free recall tests (d=1.01, Spencer & Raz [23]; d=0.97, La
Voie & Light, 1994). The meta-analysis also suggests that age
declines in prospective memory are generally small until the 50s or
60s and accelerate thereafter. In contrast, the meta-analysis of
naturalistic findings indicates that for time-cued prospective memory
proper and habitual prospective memory, the performance of older
adults surpasses the performance of younger adults. Although only
one study examined event-cued prospective memory proper in
natural settings, its results suggest that naturalistic event-cued
prospective memory proper may decline the same way as event-
cued prospective memory proper assessed in the laboratory (see
Figure 8d). Moreover, the meta-analysis reveals no evidence that
aging spares any particular domain of ProM as argued by Einstein,
McDaniel, and their colleagues (e.g., [4–6,77]).
Importantly, the meta-analysis also reveals severe methodological
problems with many previous studies of ProM: most significantly,
severe ceiling effects that artificially reduce observed age differences
(see Figures 1, 2, & 4; initially reported by Uttl [15,16], and recently
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available data); small sample sizes that make it nearly impossible to
find statistically significant age-related declines (see Figures 5e and
5f); failure to distinguish between subdomains of prospective
memory, for example, between vigilance and prospective memory
proper; and the presence of age-related confounds that reduce
observedagedifferences.Thesemethodologicalproblemsseemto be
solely responsible for ‘‘a significant number of studies [that] show
little or no age-related decrements in prospective memory
performance’’ [5]. Indeed, all studies cited by McDaniel and
Einstein [5] as showing no age-related declines in ProM are either:
(a) studies of vigilance; (b) confounded by ease of ongoing task
favoring older adults [4,8,17,55]; (c) confounded by intelligence
favoring older adults [4,56,57]; (d) suffering from severe ceiling
effects [5,55]; and/or (e) claiming no age declines based on sample
sizes so small that even large age-related declines are undetectable
(i.e., their statistical power is astonishingly small) [4]). In turn, ‘‘the
puzzleofinconsistent age-related declinesin prospective memory’’(a
book chapter title) [78] is shown to be an artifact of inadequate
methodologies and conceptual confusions.
The meta-analysis is broadly consistent with Craik’s claim [2,3]
that age declines in ProM are large and that the size of age
declines varies with demands on processing resources. Specifically,
age declines are larger for event-cued prospective memory proper
than for event-cued vigilance, larger when the ongoing task is
made more rather than less demanding for older adults, and they
are larger for time-cued vigilance than for event-cued vigilance.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that age declines on event-cued
prospective memory proper (the most resource demanding of the
three prospective memory subdomains) are at least as large as age-
related declines on the most resource demanding retrospective
memory task–free recall–if not larger. This latter conclusion is
consistent with the results of a few studies that have examined age-
related differences in prospective memory proper using continuous
measures of similar high reliability as those used to investigate age-
related differences in free recall [12].
The meta-analysis lends no support to claims that ProM is an
exception to generally found age declines [4]. The meta-analysis also
does not support the multi-process framework claiming that the
retrieval of a previous plan is automatic when prospective memory
cues are focal [6,79]. First, the experimental results offered by
McDaniel, Einstein, and their colleagues [6,79] are unambiguously
confounded by severe ceiling effects, and thus, uninterpretable.
Second, a number of studies including those by Cuttler & Graf [51],
Salthouse et al. [50], and Uttl et al. [11], used focal ProM cues and
found substantial age declines in prospective memory proper. And
third, the analysis of McDaniel and Einstein’s [6] selective
compilation of the data extracted from the published literature also
reveals substantial age declines on both focal and non-focal ProM
cue tasks, strongly contradicting the notion that aging spares
prospective memory with focal cues (see Figure 9).
The finding that age declines on event-cued prospective
memory proper are much larger than age declines on event-cued
vigilance adds to a growing body of literature demonstrating
dissociations between prospective memory proper and vigilance
(e.g., [16,21]) and highlights the need for conceptual clarity, for
using appropriate labels that clearly denote what is measured and
studied by a particular investigation [1]. In the absence of such
labels, the field is in danger of simultaneously discussing and
arguing about the properties of apples (prospective memory
proper), oranges (vigilance), and occasionally, of bananas (habitual
prospective memory).
As with experimental studies, meta-analysis depends critically
on the methodology employed by meta-analysts, most critically, on
identification of all relevant studies, assessment of each primary
study quality and design features, selection of appropriate outcome
measures and effect size indices, appropriate analysis of effect size
indices, and equally importantly, on blocking studies by experi-
mental design and quality. The comparison between the present
and Henry et al. [14] meta-analysis highlights that disregarding
these methodological considerations leads not only to unsupported
conclusions but also prevents meta-analysts from identifying
important trends and factors in the previous research. While
Henry at al. [14] argued that age declines in prospective memory
are generally smaller that those found in retrospective memory
and even absent when ongoing task demands are minimal, the
present meta-analysis demonstrates that that finding was an
artifact of failure to include all relevant published studies; to
consider reliability differences between prospective memory and
retrospective memory measures; to consider widespread ceiling
effects in primary data diminishing observed age differences; to
consider the influence of prospective memory subdomain on size
of age declines; to block primary studies by presence of age
confounds reducing observed age declines in prospective memory;
and to use effect size indices and meta-analytic methods
appropriate for dichotomous outcome data. Moreover, attention
to conceptual issues also revealed that the research in some
domains of prospective memory is so scarce as to prevent any
conclusions about the effects of aging on these subdomains of
prospective memory at this time.
The key conclusions reached in this article are supported by
outcomes of all three meta-analytic approaches: the robust count
method, the graphical model fitting method, as well as more
traditional meta-analysis based on dprobit effect size index that
underestimates d less then dp or dphi indices [43]. However, the
graphical meta-analysis combined with effect size model fitting has
several advantages over the count and traditional method: it makes
obvious many fundamental problems with primary data including
ceiling effects and yields unbiased estimate of effect size largely
unaffected by widespread ceiling effects and low reliability of
prospective memory indices. One glance at the graphical plots of
primary data shown in Figure 6 transparently informs the reader
about both the ceiling effects afflicting primary data as well as the
sizable age declines and improvements in various prospective
memory subdomains and settings (see also Figure 8)
The current meta-analysis of the relationship between prospec-
tive memory and aging highlights the feature advantages of
quantitative reviews over narrative reviews: the meta-analysis
allows systematic, explicit, quantitative, and thus a more objective
review of the literature, and is uniquely suitable for resolving
disagreement between narrative reviews that frequently come to
completely opposite conclusions. The present meta-analysis shows
that there is no evidence for the claim that ‘‘prospective memory
seems to be an exciting exception to typically found age-related
decrements in memory.’’ [4]. Instead, it strongly supports the
position that ProM declines with aging [1–3,11] and that such age
declines vary with the ProM subdomain [1,11], experimental
settings [13,14], and resource demands [2,3].
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